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Conflict Prevention and the Legitimacy of Governance Actors – 
Research Report
Karoline Eickhoff and Luise K. Müller
Abstract:
The aim of this research report is to examine the empirical literature on the connection between 
the legitimacy of governance actors and conflict prevention. As the leading hypothesis for 
this research report, we take it that legitimate governance actors and legitimate institutions 
are indispensable in the prevention of conflict. We proceed with our examination of this 
hypothesis in two steps. First, we clarify the conceptual connection between legitimacy and 
conflict prevention. We suggest that governance actors should concentrate less on stability and 
more on legitimacy because legitimate actors and institutions produce stability for the right 
reasons. Second, we discuss the practical implications of these considerations. Our findings 
are relevant both for narrow, project-based external policy initiatives in the field of conflict 
prevention and for more general governance interventions. In both cases, policies can focus 
on two dimensions. First, improving governance performance will include adjusting external 
policies to fit local legitimacy perceptions. The second dimension is the transformation of 
predominant perceptions of legitimacy. We argue that while the second strategy might not be 
impossible, it is not a viable strategy for external actors. In fact, we believe that the focus on 
this second dimension explains many of the unsuccessful attempts at governance provision 
by external actors.
Zusammenfassung:
In der vorliegenden Studie untersuchen wir den Zusammenhang zwischen der Prävention 
von Konflikten und der Legitimität von Governance-Akteuren. Uns leitet die Hypothese, 
dass legitime Governance-Akteure und legitime Institutionen für die Konfliktprävention 
unabdingbar sind. Wir gehen dabei in zwei Schritten vor: zunächst klären wir den genannten 
Zusammenhang auf der konzeptuellen Ebene. Unser Vorschlag lautet, dass sich Governance-
Akteure weniger auf Stabilität, und mehr auf Legitimität konzentrieren sollten, da legitime 
Akteure und Institutionen Stabilität aus den normativ richtigen Gründen erzeugen. Im 
zweiten Schritt diskutieren wir die Implikationen unserer Überlegungen für die praktische 
Umsetzung. Unsere Ergebnisse sind dabei sowohl für enge, projektbasierte externe Policy-
Initiativen, als auch für  breiter angelegte Governance-Interventionen von Bedeutung. 
In beiden Fällen können Initiativen an zwei Dimensionen andocken: erstens kann die 
performance-Dimension von Governance verbessert werden, indem die externen Policy-
Initiativen den lokalen Legitimitätsvorstellungen angepasst werden. Zweitens kann auf der 
konzeptuellen Ebene angesetzt werden, indem lokale Legitimitätsvorstellungen verändert 
werden. Während diese zweite Strategie nicht unmöglich scheint, sind wir davon überzeugt, 
dass ihre Effektivität sehr begrenzt ist. In den meisten Fällen sind Versuche, die externen 
Legitimitätsüberzeugungen auf die betroffenen Bevölkerung anzuwenden, zum Scheitern 
verurteilt.
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Executive Summary1 
The aim of this research report2 is to examine the empirical literature on the connection between 
the legitimacy of governance actors and conflict prevention. As the leading hypothesis for this 
research report, we presume that legitimate governance actors and legitimate institutions are 
indispensable for preventing conflict. 
We undertook this study because we believe that the policy debate on crisis prevention can 
greatly benefit from a more thorough engagement with conceptions of legitimacy and the 
interplay between legitimacy and the effectiveness of external interventions. At the same time, 
we opted for a pragmatic approach that focuses on those findings from the literature that are 
directly relevant for the design, implementation, and monitoring of projects in the field of 
crisis prevention, at the expense of a more nuanced review of the different facets of legitimacy 
debates in the social sciences. 
We begin this review by analyzing why legitimacy matters and how the existence of legitimate 
institutions and actors is connected to stability (chapter 2). We argue that not just stability by 
itself but rather stability for the right reasons is desirable: while compliance with social and political 
rules can be induced through a range of mechanisms, only some of these prevent conflict in a 
normatively acceptable and stable way. For this reason, we suggest that governance actors focus 
less on stability and more on legitimacy. We argue that the nexus between legitimacy and stable 
governance not only holds for states but also for other non-state governance actors. This is 
especially true for areas of limited statehood. 
We then examine how legitimacy can be conceptualized and what functions it serves 
(chapter 3). We argue that legitimacy produces stable compliance without costly enforcement 
mechanisms because governance recipients view legitimate governance as normatively 
appropriate. Legitimate institutions are thus more efficient because they need to overcome less 
resistance and employ less drastic means to rule. We further find that social trust is the elixir that 
enables actors to overcome collective action dilemmas in conflict prevention.
The second part of this research report (chapter 4) is dedicated to a discussion of policy 
implications for external actors, which we have distilled from the literature surveyed. Here, we 
distinguish between two dimensions for future policy: Improving the performance of governance 
will include adjusting external policies to fit local legitimacy perceptions. Engaging on the 
performance level requires that external actors and local stakeholders work together on the 
basis of explicitly shared legitimacy conceptions. 
Changing the conception of legitimacy involves efforts to transform predominant legitimacy 
perceptions. This may not be impossible, but we argue that it is not a viable strategy for external 
actors; many of the unsuccessful attempts at governance provision by external actors are 
unsuccessful because they confound performance and conception dimensions of legitimacy. 
1 We would like to thank Sarah Bressan and Felix Rüdiger for their research support, Anke Draude, 
Gregor Walter-Drop and Thomas Risse for comments on earlier versions of this paper, as well as the 
SFB 700 colleagues who participated in our preparatory workshop in April 2017 and the SFB 700 Jour 
Fixe in June 2017 for discussing the paper with us.
2 Sources of this research report are drawn from the existing literature. No new fieldwork was done or 
commissioned.
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Attempts to transform local legitimacy conceptions into conceptions considered morally 
superior by external actors are bound to fail. External actors are therefore advised to begin 
their efforts by analyzing their own legitimacy claims and comparing them to the legitimacy 
conceptions and expectations of the local population. 
With regard to the performance of external actors, we conclude that legitimacy is a necessary 
condition for the effective provision of external efforts at state-building or service provision – 
thus engagements in conflict prevention. If external actors wish to achieve sustainable results 
on the ground, they should adopt a reflexive approach to legitimacy conceptions and engage 
in trust-building measures and “legitimate governance building”. Despite the normative 
functions performed by federal structures in conflict prevention, external actors should also 
look to legitimate non-state actors as potential collaborators in areas of limited statehood. 
In the last section, we survey the existing literature on which features define legitimate 
governance actors and how to measure their legitimacy. We compile a list of conceptual elements 
concerning legitimacy from the literature, which we treat as potential legitimacy indicators. 
When measuring legitimacy, we primarily measure normative attitudes and beliefs. We find that 
legitimacy conceptions are highly context-dependent, meaning that what makes a governance 
actor or institution legitimate in one context may not count towards its legitimacy in another 
context. We advise surveying dominant legitimacy conceptions in a given context, matching 
indicators to these conceptions, and measuring whether given governance actors are perceived 
as fulfilling these indicators, as well as measuring whether these perceived activities are indeed 
met. 
While focusing on non-executive, project-based external interventions in the field of conflict 
prevention and excluding military or purely humanitarian interventions, we believe that these 
policy implications are not only relevant for conflict prevention projects in a narrow sense but 
also in more general terms for project-centered governance interventions in areas of limited 
statehood.
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1. Introduction: The Vicious Cycle of Weak Institutional Legitimacy and Violent Conflict
Since 1945, violent conflict has been a phenomenon that mainly occurs within states, rather than 
between states. In this period since 1945, violent conflict within states occur more often and with 
more casualties and last longer than conflict between states. Fearon and Laitin compare the 
numbers: “Between 1945 and 1999, about 3.33 million battle deaths occurred in the 25 interstate 
wars (...). These wars involved just 25 states (...) and had a median duration of not quite 3 months. 
In contrast, in the same period there were roughly 127 civil wars (...). A conservative estimate 
of the total dead as a direct result of these conflicts is 16.2 million, five times the interstate 
toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 states (...) and had a median duration of roughly six years” 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75). 
More recently, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program recorded 70 active conflicts between non-
state actors for 2015, the highest number since the end of the Cold War. 2014 was the second-worst 
year since the end of the Cold War in terms of fatalities from armed conflict, with only a slight 
decline in 2015. This intensification is largely attributed to developments in the Middle East, 
with Syria accounting for more than half of all fatalities from conflict with state involvement. 
The number of armed conflicts involving at least one state party went up from 41 in 2014 to 50 
in 2015, which is the second highest number since World War II. At the same time, only one of 
these active conflicts occurred between states – indicating a continuation of the trend identified 
by Fearon and Laitin for the period between 1945 and 1999 (Melander et al. 2016: 727–729).
Empirical evidence suggests that violent conflict often occurs where political institutions 
are weak and unstable. The World Development Report 2011 (World Bank 2011) indicates that 
internal and external stresses on weak institutions increase the likelihood of violent conflict: 
“(...) countries and subnational areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance 
are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal 
and external stresses” (World Bank 2011: 7). The World Bank’s view is that missing from 
countries susceptible to violence are capable, legitimate, and accountable institutions. They 
use the metaphor of a healthy immune system, embodied in legitimate institutions, that is 
capable of coping with internal and external stresses. Once the immune system is weakened – 
when institutions are illegitimate and have thus become weak – internal and external stresses 
accelerate the deterioration of violence and conflict (World Bank 2011: 86). Worse still, weak 
institutions are caught in a vicious cycle of low legitimacy. Holsti argues that the weak state 
“does not have the resources to create legitimacy by providing security and other services. In 
its attempt to find strength, it adopts predatory and kleptocratic practices or plays upon and 
exacerbates social tensions (...) Everything it does to become a strong state actually perpetuates 
its weakness” (Holsti 1996: 117). One major finding in the more recent literature is that weak state 
institutions do not necessarily translate into instability or violent conflict. Despite exhibiting 
limited statehood, some areas are surprisingly stable. As Börzel and Risse argue, those spaces 
are rarely ungoverned or ungovernable: “Weak or limited statehood does not necessarily lead to 
weak governance” (Börzel and Risse 2015: 6). For example, in some areas of limited statehood, 
non-state governance actors supply stable governance services from health and education to 
security and policing (see chapter 4 for examples and references). This is only possible when 
these governance actors enjoy at least some measure of legitimacy by the population. While 
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many governance actors at some point use coercion to induce compliance, legitimate actors 
and institutions also induce voluntary, instead of forced, compliance from their subjects when 
the subjects’ compliance is motivated by normative considerations of rightfulness. Legitimate 
institutions and actors are stable for the right reasons. 
2. Why Legitimacy Matters
The Nexus between Conflict Prevention, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy 
The term “stability”, as it applies to political institutions such as state structures, is normatively 
ambiguous. While some forms of stability are based mainly on coercion and repression, other 
forms of stability are based on voluntary compliance. The term stability itself does not imply 
whether we talk about the former, normatively dubious type of stability or about the latter, 
normatively acceptable type of stability. Subjects sometimes comply with norms because to do 
so coheres with their self-interest; they also often comply with norms because they fear potential 
sanctions, should they fail to comply. The problem with these modes of stabilization is their 
volatility, on the one hand, and their high costs to efficiency, on the other hand. Compliance 
for reasons of coherence with self-interest is highly volatile because subjects will refrain from 
complying once their self-interest ceases to align with the rules. Besides, it seems unlikely that 
most subjects’ interests would be aligned simultaneously with the given rules, as conflicts of 
interests are inevitable within political communities. Compliance with rules for fear of sanctions 
is highly cost-ineffective, as the threat of sanctions must be sufficiently high, large enough in 
scope, and sufficiently likely to make a difference to the behavior of subjects: “Governments 
that base their rule primarily on coercion expend enormous resources to create a credible 
system of surveillance through which to monitor public behavior, reward desired behavior, and 
punish rule violators” (Levi et al. 2009: 355). It requires a large institutional effort that is almost 
impossible to achieve, even more so for institutions that employ morally acceptable means. 
Both mechanisms are not very promising when the goal is long-term stability. Hence, we do 
not simply want stability, but stability for the right reasons: while compliance with social and 
political rules can be induced via a range of mechanisms, only some of them prevent conflicts 
in a normatively acceptable and stable way. 
For this reason, we suggest that governance actors focus less on stability and more on legitimacy 
– because legitimacy induces stability for the right reasons.3 
Legitimate governance structures are of key importance for stability: stability for the right 
reasons is a consequence of legitimate governance. Goldfinch found that “states with higher 
levels of legitimacy will be more stable” (DeRouen Jr. and Goldfinch 2012: 505; 509). Restoring 
the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of violence is, as Lake and Fariss argue, key to building 
state capacity (Lake and Fariss 2014: 573). While a lack of legitimacy has been found to make it 
3 This suggestion is already recognized tentatively in some international documents, for example, in the 
United Nations Development Goals. The SDG Goal No. 16 refers to access to justice for all and effective, 
accountable, and inclusive institutions.
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more likely that “violent challenges to the state or its policies develop and be sustained” (Schock 
1996: 107), promises of rebel leaders are less attractive and credible when legitimacy is widely 
felt, which makes it easier for the government to hold the state together (Taydas et al. 2010: 
199).  We find that the nexus between legitimacy and stable governance not only holds for states, 
but also for other governance actors. When governance actors are considered legitimate by the 
relevant population, the likelihood of voluntary compliance increases.
Krasner and Risse argue that legitimacy is a necessary condition for the effective provision of 
external efforts at state-building or service provision. They claim that “the absence of legitimacy 
inevitably leads to failure” (Krasner and Risse 2014: 563). Politically relevant audiences in target 
states must “accept the legitimacy of efforts by external organizations”. This, they argue, is a 
necessary condition for effectiveness: “no legitimacy, no success” (ibid.: 547). However, legitimacy 
is not a sufficient condition for success in providing governance services. Institutionalization 
and adequate resources are also important, and especially so when it comes to complex tasks. 
The three factors determining success in governance provision by external actors – legitimacy, 
task complexity, and institutionalization (including the provision of adequate resources) – are 
connected and mutually influential (ibid.: 546). A case study presented by Beisheim et al. shows 
that a lack of legitimacy led to the failure of two public-private partnerships in one case, while 
a similar public-private partnership that enjoyed a higher level of legitimacy was successful 
(Beisheim et al. 2014). The successful partnership also actively built legitimacy among local 
counterparts and beneficiaries. 
The connection between legitimacy and effectiveness has been conceptualized as a virtuous 
cycle (Schmelzle 2011). More legitimacy leads to more effective governance, which leads to 
more legitimacy. The attainment of legitimacy proceeds in iterative cycles of legitimation 
(Gilley 2009: 84). This cycle also works in the opposite direction: a lack of legitimacy often 
results in resistance from local communities, which in turn hinders efficient and effective 
service provision. Schäferhoff observes that the success of public health services in Somalia is 
determined by the perception of legitimacy (Schäferhoff 2014). Similarly, Hönke and Thauer 
show that multinational corporations effectively contribute to service provision in areas of 
limited statehood, given that they are perceived as legitimate (Hönke and Thauer 2014). When 
they assessed which conditions are associated with multinational corporations’ effective 
contribution to service provision, they found that “[g]overnance attempts by external actors 
must be built on norms that conform with domestic norms”, or else they will fail (ibid.: 698).
3. The Concept of Legitimacy
3.1 The Function of Legitimacy
Legitimacy is a normative status that designates whether a political order, institution, actor, 
or action is justifiable and/or worthy of being recognized (Draude et al. 2012). What makes an 
institution, actor, or action legitimate? The answer to this question requires a complex explanation 
that depends on the institution, actor, or action in question, but also on the conception of 
legitimacy one embraces. The first important distinction is that between the legitimacy of an 
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institution or actor and the legitimacy of an action. When we say that some action is legitimate, 
we often merely mean that doing it was justified. In contrast, legitimate institutions or actors 
are not merely justified in performing one particular action, but in governing generally. 
This is of particular interest for political scientists because this understanding of legitimacy 
describes what gives political institutions or actors the general right to govern. In much of 
the literature, a fundamental distinction is made between normative concepts of legitimacy 
and empirical concepts of legitimacy. From a normative perspective, the question is what 
makes an institution or actor legitimate according to an external or universal normative or 
moral standard? And to which normative values and rules must the institution conform to 
be legitimate? Empirical legitimacy assessments ask a different question, namely whether the 
subjects of the institutionalized rule believe that the rule is legitimate. Distinguishing between 
these two concepts of legitimacy implies that there may be a divergence between what truly 
makes an institution legitimate and what people believe makes an institution legitimate. Notice 
however that the object of both the normative and the empirical perspective is normative. Later, 
we will see that when we measure legitimacy, we mainly measure normative attitudes and beliefs. 
Because legitimacy is context-dependent, we begin by highlighting the function of legitimacy, 
utilizing the same distinction between normative and empirical types. One of the main functions 
of legitimacy is that it signals to citizens or inhabitants of a state whether or not they have 
reason to follow certain rules and commands. When institutions are perceived as legitimate, 
it is likely that most of their orders will be obeyed voluntarily by most of the subjects, most 
of the time; institutional legitimacy produces “stable compliance without costly enforcement 
mechanisms” (Schmelzle 2011: 8). When institutions are perceived as legitimate, its subjects 
generally hold the belief that its “rules and regulations are entitled to be obeyed by virtue of who 
made the decision or how it was made” (Levi et al. 2009: 354). For example, an empirical analysis 
in a number of developing societies in Africa suggests that “the more trustworthy and fair the 
government, the more likely its population will develop legitimating beliefs that lead them to 
accept government’s right to make people obey its laws and regulations” (ibid.: 367). This belief 
habitually translates into compliant behavior, where the compliant behavior is not explained 
by fear of sanctions or pure habit, but by a normative sense of obligation on the side of the 
subjects. Assessments of legitimacy turn a command into an obligation. Governance recipients 
view legitimate governance as normatively appropriate. Legitimate institutions are thus more 
efficient because they need to overcome less resistance and employ less drastic means to rule. 
They enjoy increased likelihood of compliance and thus make governance easier, as perceptions 
of legitimacy reduce transaction costs (Tyler 2006; Levi et al. 2009). 
The concept of legitimacy does not simply map onto the concept of political support; rather, 
empirical legitimacy follows a particular type of political support (Gilley 2009: 5), namely one 
that encompasses a shared normative evaluation standard. In that sense, legitimacy assessments 
also have an important normative function: to settle a common standard of evaluation in 
order to trigger enough convergence in individual judgement as to whether an institution is 
worthy of support (Buchanan 2013: 179). Under circumstances of the relative scarcity of goods 
and resources, the allocation of such goods and resources requires political decision-making, 
as goods and resources can be distributed according to a variety of principles and patterns. 
Additionally, there is a variety of possibilities when it comes to the question of organizing 
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the allocation. It is likely that different people disagree about what ought to be done, both 
concerning the outcome of the allocation, as well as the process of allocating the goods and 
resources. The reason for this disagreement is not necessarily the result of egoism, injustice, 
or ignorance, but generally due to the fact that there is no one right answer to questions of 
allocation outcome and procedure. The limitations on knowledge and thought, the variance 
in personal experience, and the fact that facts usually require interpretation are among the 
reasons for why even reasonable people tend to disagree about the “right” or “just” allocation 
outcome or procedure (Rawls 1999). This fact of disagreement explains the normative function 
of legitimacy assessments, as it denotes institutions and actors that possess a certain standing, 
which allows them to determine allocations even if they go against the explicit judgements of (a 
segment of ) the governance subjects. As long as the institution or actor is deemed “legitimate”, 
it will be able to function and will elicit sufficient support, even when this institution or actor 
acts against substantive conceptions of “what one ought to do”. In short: legitimate institutions 
coordinate collective action when there is no initial agreement on how to distribute goods.
3.2 The Criteria of Legitimacy
Up until now, we have examined the concept of legitimacy in a functional and formal manner, 
not having said anything substantial about the criteria for legitimacy. How must institutions and 
actors be constituted to be legitimate, and how must they behave to be legitimate? Unfortunately, 
there is no easy answer to this question. The reason for this is multi-faceted. The problem of 
disagreement – for which, as we have seen, legitimacy assessments are a functional solution 
– repeats itself at the stage of identifying the criteria of legitimacy. For example, in terms of 
legitimacy, some governance subjects may value effectiveness, while others value inclusiveness. 
Additionally, different criteria apply to different actors, institutions, and services. What makes 
domestic actors legitimate may differ from what makes external actors legitimate. Lastly, the 
legitimacy of institutions and actors may be set together from a number of legitimacy criteria. 
The challenge is thus to identify criteria that are abstract enough and indicators that are of 
use in a variety of cultural and political contexts. In order to find out what it is that gives 
specific institutions and actors the normative standing to make political decisions in the face 
of disagreement, it is necessary to assess the empirical legitimacy conceptions in the relevant 
population. We discuss the problems and methods of measuring legitimacy, including a list of 
legitimacy indicators, in chapter 4. 
In everyday conversation, we will most likely refer to legitimacy as if it is an all-or-nothing 
affair. In terms of ideal types, institutions and actors are either legitimate or illegitimate. 
But in the real world, the line between legitimate and illegitimate is blurred: the history of 
political regimes suggests that legitimacy is a scale that may slowly slide to one side until it 
reaches collapse. The idea of a “dichotomous legitimacy“, Gilley notes, fades quickly once one 
takes a closer look at the real world (Gilley 2009: 11). Measuring legitimacy is then a matter of 
legitimacy-mapping on a scale from high to low – a scale on which there may or may not be a 
point of collapse. 
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What it is for an institution or actor to be legitimate means different things to different 
groups. Nevertheless, we can make a number of useful distinctions that help categorize and 
identify different legitimacy conceptions in the abstract. This will aid in fine-tuning the 
legitimacy indicators that are applicable to different groups. A classic distinction is made by 
the sociologist Max Weber, who differentiates different ideal types of the sources of legitimacy: 
charismatic rule, bureaucratic rationality, and adherence to tradition (Weber 1978). For legitimacy 
based on charismatic rule, trust in the leader by governance recipients may be an important 
criterion. Legitimacy based on bureaucratic rationality may be assessed by the reliability of 
governance service provision and the perception of non-corrupt officials. And lastly, the criteria 
for legitimacy based on adherence to tradition may include the measurement of the population’s 
perception of a leader’s respect for values and principles and the population’s perception of the 
local fit of external actors’ activities. 
Another classic and widely used distinction between different criteria of legitimacy has been 
introduced by Fritz W. Scharpf, who distinguishes input-legitimacy from output-legitimacy 
(Scharpf 1999). Because of its formal character, this distinction is applicable to different political 
and cultural contexts. Input-oriented legitimacy criteria tend to emphasize procedural values 
such as inclusion and influence of the governance subjects: “Political choices are legitimate if 
and because they reflect the ‚will of the people‘“ (Scharpf 1999: 6). Output-oriented legitimacy 
criteria tend to emphasize actual governance achievements or benefits: “Political choices are 
legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency 
in question“ (ibid.: 6). Promotion of the common welfare may come in the form of material 
goods, security, and the effective capacity to keep order within a territory4 (Draude et al. 2011). 
There is increasing empirical evidence to suggest that, for state legitimacy, it matters more 
“how things are done“ (input-legitimacy) than what decisions are made and what services are 
provided (output-legitimacy): “Perceptions of equity, distributive justice, or fairness in decision-
making may matter for legitimacy more than expansions in access“ (Combaz and Mcloughlin 
2016: 1). In an earlier article, Mcloughlin argues that a purely outcome-oriented approach to 
legitimacy is insufficient. Instead, we ought to look “beyond the material to the ideational and 
relational significance of services for citizens‘ evaluations of the state“ (Mcloughlin 2015: 342). 
These considerations should prompt us to always consider both input- and output-legitimacy 
criteria and refrain from looking solely at the one or the other. 
These points explain why a one-size-fits-all approach to governance legitimacy brings 
extensive problems along with it. While, in some contexts, effective governance delivery is 
sufficient to satisfy expectations of legitimacy, in others, only democratic inclusion will do. 
However, there seem to be some common sources, patterns, and standards of legitimacy that 
take on different local forms. Legitimacy is not radically contingent. Rather, as Gilley argues, 
there is an underlying structure to the differing concepts of legitimacy. In particular, Giley 
claims that this set includes participation, welfare, efficiency, and accountability (Gilley 2009: 
43). We capture these common underlying structures in our list of indicators. Nevertheless, 
these universal structures find distinct expression in different contexts. This gives us reason to 
4 The World Development Report refers to these criteria as “Performance legitimacy (capacity) that is 
earned by the effective discharge of its agreed duties, particularly the provision of security, economic 
oversight and services, and justice” (World Bank 2011: 84).
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emphasize some indicators as more important in some contexts, and others as more important 
in other contexts. This variance also points to the fact that policy measures will have to be 
contextualized to fit local practice. “Best-fit“ approaches instead of “one-size-fits-all“ approaches 
are required if the governance provision is to be successful.
4. Policy Implications
We now come to policy implications of the reviewed literature for external actors who wish to 
engage in conflict prevention in what we call a “legitimacy-reflexive” manner. The literature 
reviewed suggests that there is no legitimacy conception that fits all governance constellations. 
Violent conflict is highly context- and path-dependent. It is thus important to appreciate the 
fact that there is no blueprint for a successful legitimacy increase that fits every context. Hence, 
there will obviously be no policy implications that fit all situations and regions. However, we 
can deduce from the literature that the legitimacy of governance actors matters to conflict 
prevention in areas of limited statehood and that adopting a reflexive approach to legitimacy 
conceptions means reflecting on legitimacy in project design, implementation, and evaluation 
from two perspectives. 
The first perspective is concerned with the legitimacy of external actors who become part 
of a domestic governance setup and, to a certain extent, interfere with domestic sovereignty. 
Perceptions of the rightfulness and adequacy of external intervention matter to the success 
of interventions in support of crisis prevention and may vary on local, national, and regional 
levels. At the same time, external actors have different home constituencies, which constitute 
decoupled legitimacy arenas for which external actors must account, in order to secure sustained 
support. 
The second perspective pertains to angles external actors can make use of in order to 
influence the legitimacy of domestic governance institutions. The policy implications focus on 
the second perspective, while selectively touching on the first, if the findings of the previous 
chapters allow for inferences regarding the legitimacy of external actors themselves. Indeed, we 
argue that the legitimacy of external actors intervening in crisis prevention and the legitimacy 
of the governance institutions supported are contingent on each other and, to a certain extent, 
represent different sides of a coin in the context of crisis prevention projects.
4.1 Dimensions of Engagement
The first distinction we want to introduce is between performance and conception dimensions 
of legitimacy as crucial to the structuring of our policy recommendations. We want to stress that 
many of the unsuccessful attempts at governance provision by external actors are unsuccessful 
because they confound these distinct dimensions of legitimacy. 
Policies for increasing the legitimacy of institutions and actors can attach to two dimensions: 
they can either attempt to improve the performance of governance (I-II), or they can attempt to 
change the conception of legitimacy (III-IV). Improving the performance of governance will 
necessarily include taking into account local perceptions of legitimacy and adjusting policy to 
fit those legitimacy perceptions. Within this dimension, the performance of input-legitimacy (I) 
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as well as output-legitimacy (II) can be enhanced. Changing the conception of legitimacy requires 
efforts to transform predominant legitimacy perceptions, either applying to the input (III) or 
the output (IV) of policies. The table with cells I to IV aids in understanding at what levels 




I. Increasing performance at the input-level
External actors can aim to enhance the legitimacy of domestic institutions by enhancing the 
performance of their procedures, for example by fostering citizen participation in public 
decision-making or in public accountability. In areas where societal divisions exist concerning 
which modes of governance provision are deemed legitimate, this could involve facilitating 
local consensus on legitimate governance provision (including consensus on legitimate conflict 
management). Importantly, this requires that the legitimacy conceptions of those who are 
the stakeholders in that very policy field be taken seriously. At the local level, this is the local 
community. Instead of building up parallel structures that compete against local functional 
equivalents, external actors should collaborate with local service providers and enable citizens 
to play a productive role. Engaging on the performance level requires that external actors and 
local stakeholders work together on the basis of explicitly shared legitimacy conceptions. The 
objective is to improve the performance of a governance system based on legitimacy conceptions 
that external actors and local stakeholders agree on.
II. Increasing performance at the output-level
Working solely on legitimacy through measures at the output-level – for example, by improving 
service delivery – will have limited impact. As the literature suggests, in many cases, strengthening 
input-legitimacy is indeed more important than output-legitimacy. We argue that external 
governance services aimed solely at the output side of governance provision should only be 
considered in situations of imminent threats and humanitarian crisis. Without reflecting the 
input-side of governance provision in programming, external engagement will do little to 
prevent conflict in the long run. 
However, it should not be forgotten that governance provision is not only about quantity 
and reach of governance services, but also concerns the parameters of the provision process. 
This is conceptually close to the input-side of governance performance (procedures, field I) but 
should be evaluated and considered from a different angle that external actors can utilize. In the 
actual provision of governance, values of fairness, impartiality, and reciprocity can also serve to 
improve the legitimacy of governance provision and the legitimacy of the institution providing 
the services. 
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III. Transforming the legitimacy conception at the input-level
An entirely different approach to which an external actor may revert is the transformation of 
legitimacy conceptions. This approach involves a significantly stronger interference of external 
actors with national self-determination than is the case when working under the assumption of 
shared legitimacy conceptions. Applied to input-legitimacy conceptions, we can take the example 
of democratization. In many cases, democratization will be understood as an intervention that 
only operates at the performance level – when external actors imply that democracy-based 
legitimacy conceptions already prevail in the area of intervention. However, democratization 
programs might also aim at a transition from rule by a charismatic leader to rule by democracy. 
One major insight from the empirical studies is that the attempt to transform local legitimacy 
conceptions into conceptions considered morally superior by external actors are bound to 
fail. When external governance actors insist on a procedure that they identify as legitimate, in 
contrast to the legitimacy perceptions of the local population, procedures will be formal but 
substantively empty in terms of legitimacy. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) found that, under these 
circumstances, democratization can even be destabilizing. One hypothesis that emerged during 
our deliberations is that it is precisely the external actors’ (implicit) focus on transforming 
conceptions of legitimacy in local contexts that has led to the failure of many projects.
IV. Transforming the legitimacy conception at the output-level
External actors can also attempt to transform beliefs about legitimacy conceptions at the output 
level. Take the example of security. Transforming local conceptions of security might mean, for 
example, that “being safe” does not only mean “being safe from terrorist or military attacks”, 
but also “being safe from interpersonal violence”. Like engagements on the input level of 
legitimacy, this involves strong interference with domestic legitimacy conceptions and requires 
a substantial normative basis. In view of the interdependence between the sides of input and 
output, we find that attempts to enhance the output of governance services on the basis of what 
external actors deem to be a normatively desirable governance service are likely to fail, both on 
the procedural as well as on the output level.
4.2 Implications for Project Design
The distinction between performance and conceptual dimensions of legitimacy has implications 
for the planning phase of interventions: External actors are advised to start programming by 
analyzing their own legitimacy claims and by comparing them to the legitimacy conceptions 
and expectations of the local population. This should already occur within the conceptualization 
phase, before interventions even begin. If divisions emerge, which is likely given that legitimacy 
perceptions are highly context-specific, external actors should appraise the consequences of 
these divisions for their envisaged theories of change. Are theories of change based on the 
assumption of shared legitimacy conceptions? Has the organization or the donor erected 
certain boundaries with regard to legitimacy conceptions that cannot be negotiated? Women’s 
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rights to participate in public decision-making is only one example of divisions in legitimacy 
conceptions leading to trade-offs. 
In the overall picture, transforming local legitimacy conceptions may not be impossible, but 
we argue that it is not a viable strategy for external actors. If the policy preferences of external 
actors are imposed, the local population is likely to reject the project, leading ultimately to 
the project’s failure. If a transformation such as the transformation from one type of rule to 
another type of rule is to take place at all, the external actors need a normatively substantiated 
basis for their engagement and must make the envisaged depth of intervention explicit. Further 
required is a local deliberation and transformation process that is not steered by external actors, 
although it may be possible for external actors to initiate or nudge along such a process. 
4.3 Implications for Project Implementation
I. Modes of Engagement
According to Beisheim et al. (2014: 664), the cases they have analyzed “illustrate that PPPs need 
to build local legitimacy (...) if they wish to achieve sustainable results on the ground. They can 
do so by investing in communication, building trust, and including local public authorities, 
communities, target groups, and service providers in the planning and implementation of 
projects.” If external actors work through and with domestic partners, they have the choice 
between different modes of engagement. While trusteeships do not build state capacity and 
have no discernible effect on governance provision (Lake and Fariss 2014: 582), state-building 
through contracts between host state and external actors are considered more legitimate 
(Matanock 2014; Börzel and van Hüllen 2014). Another example for the connection between 
legitimacy perception and best-fit approaches comes from empirical research in Afghanistan. A 
qualitative study asking Afghans’ views on the ISAF troops finds that those Afghans who support 
the presence of the international troops posited that the troops must not be directly involved in 
Afghan politics and should merely support the Afghan government in rooting out corruption 
and implementing Afghan laws in accordance with Islam. These forms of “contracting out” 
(OECD 2010), however, require a minimum level of state capacity, which, if it is there at all, 
allows for the delivery of complex tasks. In line with this “contracting-out approach”, Risse and 
Krasner argue that “External actors are more likely to enjoy input-legitimacy and, hence, to be 
effective if they are operating through institutional arrangements that were created through 
contracting rather than imposition. Contracts are voluntary. They will only be signed if all 
parties perceive themselves to be better off” (Krasner and Risse 2014: 556).
II. Building Governance
Effective service provision need not always follow a state-centered view of legitimacy. This is why 
we argue that a policy change is necessary: instead of attempting “liberal state building”, policy 
actors should engage in “legitimate governance building”. Stabilizing or operating through 
federal or national governance structures is not always the most effective means of achieving 
legitimacy and preventing conflict. Existing governance structures on the ground should be 
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analyzed, and in cases where federal statehood is (severely) limited in terms of effectiveness or 
legitimacy, measures for crisis prevention should be implemented in collaboration with the 
local population. In some cases, this may mean including non-state local governance providers. 
This is of particular relevance in areas of limited statehood. 
Despite the positive potential of collaborating with non-state service providers, certain 
dangers remain. One of them is the danger that the population “may no longer see service 
provision as the responsibility of the state, but may rather see the role of the state as facilitating 
the delivery of services by non-state actors” (Denney et al. 2015: 2). This may lead to a further 
limitation of state capacity and thereby weaken the state’s image as a service provider – and 
ultimately as a legitimate institution. The other side of the coin is that states may feel less 
incentivized to invest in national systems that provide reliable governance (Rocha Menocal 2013). 
Another normative danger lies in the fact that at least some of the services by non-state actors 
are partisan by nature. This is, for example, the case with multinational corporations, which 
tend to exclude non-workers from direct service provision (although this does not mean that 
no non-worker will ever benefit). Some NGOs have specific agendas that may lead to exclusion. 
Moreover, local leaders may rely on group-based or financial support and therefore exclude a 
portion of governance service recipients. If governance is not inclusive and roughly equitable, it 
can reinforce the same grievances and divisions that triggered earlier conflict (UNPSO 2012: 9). 
Therefore, the federal state as a governance model still plays a key role. As we have found 
above, federal structures have the normative function of fencing in disagreements, opening up 
a space in which those disagreements can be voiced and arbitrated politically, instead of with 
violent means. Moreover, conflict prevention is a complex task by default. Complex tasks require 
not only local legitimacy but also institutionalized arrangements to coordinate and structure 
the provision of governance as well as the interactions between governance actors. (Matanock 
2014; Beisheim et al. 2014; Hönke and Thauer 2014; Schäferhoff 2014). Yet building statehood 
may well be a more long-term project than previously perceived, and external governance actors 
are well advised to take non-state governance into account. 
Fostering Social Trust
“Formal order... is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, 
which the formal scheme does not recognize, without which it could not exist, and which it 
alone cannot create and maintain” (Scott 1998: 310). The last part of this quote is particularly 
important to understanding the prerequisites for building a legitimate order. The literature 
suggests that a lack of social trust leads to the erosion of political institutions. Social trust is 
“a major precondition for effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood 
with dysfunctional formal institutions” (Börzel and Risse 2015: 8). As such, social trust is also an 
important angle for external actors aiming to strengthen legitimate governance institutions. 
The reason for the close connection between social trust and legitimate political institutions 
is that social trust facilitates group agency. We have seen that the normative function of legitimacy 
is to coordinate collective action in the face of disagreement over what is considered just. For 
this to function, a minimum of trust in those who are governed under the same institution is 
necessary: only when I can generally rely on the belief that most others will obey a given rule, 
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most of the time, is it rational for me to obey a given rule, too. For that general belief to emerge, 
I need to trust that they share my belief. Social trust is the elixir that enables actors to overcome 
collective action dilemmas as it provides assurance that others will comply too. Gilley argues 
that social trust can enable institutions to develop their legitimacy and break out of the vicious 
cycle, as governance recipients make a leap of faith by having the reasonable expectation that 
governance performance will get better: “virtuous cycles of legitimation (...) begin with trust and 
are spurred on by a shared sense of common purpose” (Giley 2009: 92). Similarly, Börzel and 
Risse argue that where there is intergroup social trust, there is likely to be legitimate authority: 
“Communities whose members trust each other are likely to put leaders in charge and convey 
authority and rules to people whom they also trust” (Börzel and Risse 2015: 9). Social trust has 
three dimensions. Interpersonal trust is trust in individuals with whom one has a personal 
connection; particularized trust is group-based trust and is contingent on social identities; and 
generalized trust is trust that reaches beyond personal connections. 
Börzel and Risse argue that one main challenge is to move from personalized to generalized 
trust, so that person A trusts person B even though they have no personal connection. This 
can occur when both individuals are part of the same imagined community (Anderson 1991). 
Generalized trust, they conclude, depends on inclusive social identities (Börzel and Risse 2015). 
According to this thinking, it would be advisable for external actors to focus on generalized 
trust as a pre-condition to legitimate institutions by fostering social trust and helping to restore 
inter-group confidence and confidence in local institutions. 
At the same time, governance actors should be careful when engaging in building social 
trust that is not generalized. Börzel and Risse argue that “personalized social trust among 
ethnic or faith-based communities might prevent rather than foster generalized trust across 
diverse communities” (Risse/Börzel 2015: 12). Shared normative beliefs and practices are good 
in principle but can be dangerous, because depending on the distribution of these normative 
beliefs and practices may result in the exclusion of some groups or individuals. This is true 
particularly of areas of limited statehood, where social heterogeneity is often high. Here, 
generalized social trust is difficult to foster, as ethnic or faith-based identities have often been 
at the center of conflict, and animosities have grown over decades. It is likely that, in these areas, 
we will find mistrust and hatred among different identities. However, generalized social trust 
can be “learned”: positive experience fosters trust. Regular social interaction in associations 
and networks of civic engagements can be the means to this end. Where these experiences are 
absent, the building of social trust must rely on formal political and legal institutions. Börzel 
and Risse conclude that it is “crucial in socially and culturally heterogeneous areas of limited 
statehood to construct overlapping identities that allow for ‘communities among strangers’ (...)” 
(Risse/Börzel 2015: 15). 
Draude et al propose that generalized trust can develop through everyday experiences of 
fairness, impartiality, and reciprocity, as these experiences contribute to the predictability of 
institutions (Draude et al 2018). These values should not only be reflected in the theory of change 
for the domestic institution that is supported, but also in the performance (standard operating 
procedures) of the external actors as part of the domestic governance setup. If contingent upon 
one another, external interventions will be more successful in terms of fostering the legitimacy 
of domestic institutions, if the external actor lives up to the same benchmarks that are expected 
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to create predictability in the eyes of the affected population. Project activities should therefore 
be monitored through the lenses of fairness, impartiality, and reciprocity.
4.4 Implications for Monitoring & Evaluation
I. Measuring Legitimacy
To date, legitimacy features significantly less in Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) exercises 
than in effectiveness of external intervention. Therefore, we propose a set of determinants of 
legitimacy that external actors can draw upon in M&E exercises. In view of the context- and 
path-dependent character of legitimacy, this list cannot be exhaustive. At the same time, we 
acknowledge that, from a pragmatic perspective, external actors will not be able to account 
for all determinants in their crisis prevention programming. The list is envisaged to provide 
external actors with a “toolbox” for M&E exercises, from which they can pick determinants 
and transform them into indicators that are relevant and measureable in the context of their 
projects.
However, M&E should not only focus on the envisaged changes in the domestic institutional 
setup. In order to also account for the role of the external actor within the institutional setup, 
a reflexive approach should be adopted, which entails feedback loops and the systematic 
monitoring of external actors’ actions, as well. International or regional organizations can help 
to monitor results and evaluate external governance actors. 
II. Determinants of Legitimacy
Measuring legitimacy is difficult. In her 2005 presidential address to the American Political 
Science Association, Margaret Levi stated that legitimacy “is a complex concept that includes 
many elements, but no one (...) has successfully sorted out which of the various elements are 
necessary or how to measure indicators or their interactions“ (Levi 2006: 13). As we have seen 
above, conceptions of legitimacy are highly context-dependent, which makes it impossible to 
devise one formula for measuring the legitimacy of orders, institutions, or actors. Yet beyond 
this fundamental problem, other operational and conceptual hurdles await, especially when 
the aim is to measure legitimacy in contexts of limited statehood. Von Haldenwang notes that 
“one could almost say that the more precarious the apparent legitimacy of a political order, the 
more difficult it is to put this impression to a rigorous test“ (von Haldenwang 2016: 1). One of 
the reasons for this is that reliable data on fragile or conflict-ridden areas is limited, as it has 
not yet been collected. But beyond this issue, there are a number of conceptual problems. One 
is that there is no consensus on types of legitimacy. Another problem relates to difficulties in 
finding valued and reliable indicators for the different legitimacy dimensions (von Haldenwang 
2016: 2). Both problems contribute to the fact that the empirical literature often measures levels 
of support instead of levels of legitimacy. Similarly, it is often unclear whether trust in political 
institutions and legitimacy denote the same phenomena. 
What makes measuring legitimacy also difficult is the aforementioned fact that substantive 
legitimacy criteria are subject to disagreement. Additionally, the set of features that indicate 
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a legitimate governance actor varies according to context. Measuring legitimacy will thus not 
be a matter of abstractly identifying what makes a governance actor legitimate from one‘s own 
normative standpoint, then measuring whether the given actors do, in fact, conform to those 
values. Instead, we advise surveying the existing or dominant legitimacy conceptions in a given 
context, matching indicators to these conceptions, then measuring whether governance actors 
are perceived to fulfill them, as well as measuring whether these conceptions are indeed fulfilled. 
In order for such a survey on legitimacy conceptions not to being simply from nowhere, we 
have collected case studies from the empirical literature. From these studies, we have devised 
a list of conceptual elements (or subtypes) of legitimacy, which we treat as potential legitimacy 
indicators. 
The first set of indicators, which we call bottom-up legitimacy determinants (i and ii), pertain to 
the beliefs and behavior of the governed towards the governance actor. Measuring them will 
require us to look at governance recipients. Measuring beliefs is quite straightforward because 
beliefs can be asked about directly in interviews and questionnaires. They are nevertheless 
not without methodological problems: respondents might distort results because of fear, 
discomfort, or absence of opinion on the matter (Gilley 2009: 12). They may, for example, give 
the reply they think the interviewer wants. Ideally, the belief in legitimate governance translates 
into compliant behavior, so supplementing the measurement of belief with the measurement 
of behavior thus seems advisable. Still, behavioral indicators are also problematic: they are 
based on an assumed causal connection between behavior and belief, and this assumption 
can simply be false. Compliant behavior can have many reasons other than the belief in the 
legitimacy of the governance actors – for example, habit or fear of sanction. An indicator like 
“peaceful political protest” may or may not say something about legitimacy; it may as well 
say something about the political culture, political institutions, and current political issues 
(ibid.: 12). Non-compliant behavior can indicate assessments of illegitimacy, as is likely the case 
with an indicator like “violent political protest”. However, non-compliant behavior can also 
have nothing to do with legitimacy, as in individual cases of tax avoidance or breaches of the 
law. We have to be careful about causal connections between legitimacy belief and compliant 
behavior. Notice that behavioral indicators alone are not a good indicator of legitimacy: citizens 
paying taxes, abiding by the law, or voting in elections can perform these actions for a variety of 
reasons, none of which are necessarily because they accept the governance actor as legitimate. 
Behavioral indicators thus only work in tandem with belief indicators, as these can help falsify 
uttered belief indicators, for example, when respondents perceive judicial institutions as fair 
and legitimate but routinely resort to violence when judicial outcomes do not accord with their 
interests. They may also be useful in distinguishing legitimacy phenomena from other related 
phenomena, such as trust in specific governance officials.  
The second set of indicators are top-down legitimacy determinants (j and jj), which pertain 
to governance actors. The determinants in this set are again distinguished in claims and 
performance. Measuring them will require concentrating on the claims and actions of 
governance providers. One of the reasons we include top-down legitimacy determinants in the 
determinants of legitimacy is that, as discussed above, legitimacy can be conceptualized as a 
virtuous cycle. The performance of governance providers, when viewed in tandem with the 
dominant conception of legitimacy in the relevant population, can tell us whether the cycle is 
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indeed virtuous. The legitimacy claims of governance providers, when compared and contrasted 
to the legitimacy perceptions of the relevant population, can give us information as to the extent 
at which the claims of governance providers are coherent with the perceptions of legitimacy of 
the governance recipients and whether the relevant population “buys” or believes the legitimacy 
claims of governance providers. The claims of governance providers as to why they engage in 
governance usually refer in some way to their role in satisfying the common good, whatever they 
hold this common good to be. For this legitimacy determinant, we provide tentative ideal types 
instead of examples from case studies. Although the claims table deviates from the other tables, 
it is important to include it, not least because it assists external governance actors who use the 
list of governance determinants in reflecting critically on their own role. And lastly, when the 
legitimacy claims of the governance providers are contrasted to actual governance performance, 
we may learn something interesting about where performance should be enhanced. 
Note that neither of the indicators is an element necessary to legitimacy in any given context. 
Some governance constellations may score very low on some indicators, while having high 
overall legitimacy. Legitimacy is likely to consist of different elements (denoted by different 
indicators) that are weighted differently in different contexts. Notice also that none of the 
indicators apply exclusively to federal governments. Instead, they may be used to measure and 
evaluate the legitimacy of a variety of governance actors and governance recipients. This is 
especially important in contexts where federal structures – or for that matter, statehood on 
any level – are or is limited. It is a misconception that there is no governance activity in areas 
of limited statehood. On the contrary, the literature abounds with examples of non-state 
governance actors: those can be external agents, like NGOs, foreign troops, or multinational 
corporations, as well as non-state local actors, such as warlords and local strongmen, community 
groups, and traditional authorities. In general, the legitimacy indicators apply both to these 
external governance actors and local non-state governance actors. 
III. Bottom Up Legitimacy Determinants
Attitudes
perception of access or 
influence
“no taxation without representation“
Levi and Sacks (2009) find that the under-representation of a group in the 
legislature or the assignment of permanent minority status may reduce 
the group members‘ sense of ownership, increase their sense of injustice 
and partiality in the determination of policy, and dampen their quasi-vol-
untary compliance.
The research by Lake and Fariss (2014) suggests that external efforts at 
state-building that include military interventions and hierarchical imposi-
tion are likely to be unsuccessful because “they cannot secure local legiti-
macy and/or sufficient resources“.
Wee et al. (2014: 14) argue that the “perception of historic marginaliza-
tion and discrimination by the state in the eyes of the Tuareg and Arab 
respondents constitute obstacles to generating a legitimate state-spon-
sored justice system” in Northern Mali.
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perception of proce-
dural fairness and im-
partiality
Levi et al. (2009: 366) find considerable evidence of a link between proce-
dural justice and deference to government authority.
Brinkerhoff et al. (2012: 278) argue that, in the case of electricity ser-
vice in Iraq, the perception of some groups having access to state services 
while others do not can lead to withdrawal of acceptance and potentially 
the re-ignition of conflict. In this case, delivering more services did not 
enhance legitimacy.
In their qualitative research in Liberia, Nepal, and Colombia, Dix et al. 
[2012, quoted in McLoughlin (2015: 350)] found that unequal or exclu-
sionary access to public goods was detrimental to citizens’ views of the 
state’s rightfulness.
Fisk and Cherney (2017) find that procedural justice, measured as per-
ceived fairness, respectful treatment, voice, and neutrality is more strong-
ly associated with citizen perceptions of institutional legitimacy than in 
strumental outcomes, such as service delivery, distributive justice, and 
outcome favorability: “Results indicate that the relationship between ser-
vice delivery and legitimacy is not as simple as previously assumed. We 
conclude that procedural justice is crucial for building perceptions of gov-
ernment legitimacy in post-conflict societies and discuss implications for 
policy and practice relating to post-conflict governance and institutional 
trust building” (ibid.: 263).
Stel and Ndayiragije (2014: 9ff.) report the process of stakeholder interac-
tion, coordination, and implementation to be more relevant for an im-
provement in people’s perception of state institutions’ legitimacy than 
the quality of services delivered. They conclude that, especially in cases 
when the state is not expected to deliver high-quality service, people 
base their judgement of state institutions’ performance more on percep-
tions of procedural fairness.
Linde (2012) identifies public perceptions of procedural fairness and im-
partiality as a key source of support for democratic rule in Eastern Europe, 
while Booth and Seligson (2009) show that perceptions of procedural in-
justice and corruption have a negative impact on political support in eight 




Political interest is found to be positively correlated with support for de-
mocracy in a study on the new Eastern European democracies (Linde 
2012), while Mishler and Rose (2001), in a quantitative assessment of 38 
countries, find a correlation between their indicator for political interest 
and political support for a regime.
satisfaction with and 
support of political 
institutions and agents
Taylor and Jackson (2013) operationalize legitimacy as citizens’ percep-
tions of whether or not state institutions and agents of the law are rightful 
holders of authority. 
The CAST Fragile States Index Indicator for State Legitimacy, used for the 
Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index, includes a measurement of the ex-
tent to which the government has the confidence of the people (FfP 2014: 
11).
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trust in institutions Fisk and Cherney (2017: 270) measure legitimacy as citizens’ expressions 
of their trust and confidence in the government, respect for the govern-
ment, and the perception that the government is operating in the best 
interest of the people.
confidence in leaders Von Haldenwang (2016: 27) argues for a cautious, context-specific evalu-
ation of perceptions of leaders: “The opinions respondents in Venezuela 
held in 2010 regarding their ruler Chávez were probably much more rele-
vant for the legitimacy of the political regime than what people in Germa-
ny at the same time thought of chancellor Merkel. This is so because the 
procurement of legitimacy in Venezuela under Chávez was based much 
more on personal leadership (charismatic rule) than in the German case.”
perception of social 
policies
Beisheim et al. (2014) examine determinants of the effectiveness of pub-
lic-private partnerships for food fortification. They find that local activist 
networks in India have urged consumers to reject two PPPs’ products, 
arguing that the products open the door for multinational corporations, 
which will destroy local markets. Further, the activist networks have sug-
gested that these PPPs’ approaches are wrong-headed, as more emphasis 
should be given to viable political strategies that secure food supply. Ac-
tivism is assumed to be indicative of a lack of PPP legitimacy and has been 
found to lead to the rejection of these specific PPPs.
perception of admin-
istrative competence 
and perception of cor-
ruption
Levi et al. (2009: 365) find that “a perception that the government is com-
petent, as opposed to believing that the government is corrupt, translates 
into an average 17.33 percentage point increase in the probability that a 
respondent will accept the court‘s, tax department‘s, and police‘s author-
ity, respectively”.
Similar results are found for the correlation between perceptions of ad-
ministrative competence and tax compliance (Levi and Sacks 2009: 326).
Brinkerhoff et al. (2012: 278) report that perception of state incapacity 
threatened the legitimacy of governments in post-invasion Iraq. For ex-
ample, they argue that when user cost for some services were increased 
without evidence of better service, the trust in state legitimacy may be 
undermined.
CAST Fragile States Index Indicator for State Legitimacy, used for the Fund 
for Peace’s Fragile States Index, includes a measurement of the extent to 
which federal and/or local officials are considered to be corrupt (FfP 2014: 
11).
Wee et al. (2014: 14) report that “judicial corruption fuels the perception 
of state illegitimacy” in Mali, as well as the “widespread perception that 
money trumps authority and legitimacy”.
perceptions of security There is no conclusive evidence as to how perceptions of security relate 
to state legitimacy. Indeed, findings from different cases are directly con-
tradictive, whereas there is a lack of more encompassing quantitative 
studies.
Sabarre et al. (2013) find that perceptions of high security are correlat-
ed with perceptions of greater state legitimacy in their survey of 2,039
Conflict Prevention and the Legitimacy of Governance Actor: Research Report  |  24
Afghans. Suggesting that the reverse is also true, Jackson (2014) finds 
that, in South Africa, higher levels of worry about crime and the experi-
ence of victimization are correlated with lower levels of perceived legiti-
macy of state security agents, particularly the police.
Complicating the picture, Stollenwerk (2015: 21), for the case of Nige-
ria, finds that “the safer people feel, the less likely they are to attribute 
legitimacy to the state”, which he attributes in part to the relevance of 
non-state security providers combined with the historically problem-
atic role of the state in security provision. Carter (2011) finds that as 
people’s fear of crime increases, they are more likely to support the 
state, with one possible explanation being that victimization brings in-
dividuals in contact with the state, which can have a legitimizing effect.
identification with po-
litical order/local fit/
respect for local values, 
traditions, customs
Building on a case study of Afghanistan, Karlborg (2014) argues that gov-
ernance providers’ interaction with the local population must resonate 
with local norms, values, and principles, as it may otherwise be that host 
citizens do not accept their legitimacy. Afghans that supported the with-
drawal of ISAF troops did so on the grounds that the Afghan police force 
and military may be corrupt and far from perfect, but more suitable to 
protect Afghans because “they respect the religion, law, and morals of 
Afghan communities“ (ibid.: 439).  
perception of overall 
government perfor-
mance 
Barma et al. (2014) define and measure legitimacy equivalent to satisfac-
tion with an agency’s performance. But Combaz and McLoughlin (2016: 
3) criticize this unproven assumption that satisfaction with services has an 
automatic effect on the legitimacy of regimes. 
Therefore, McLoughlin (2015: 341) cautions researchers and practitioners 
about equating perceptions of government performance and legitimacy, 
as “the relationship between a state’s performance in delivering services 
and its degree of legitimacy is nonlinear. Specifically, this relationship is 
conditioned by expectations of what the state should provide, subjective 
assessments of impartiality and distributive justice, the relational aspects 
of provision, how easy it is to attribute (credit or blame) performance to 
the state, and the characteristics of the service” (ibid.: 341).
Sacks’s (2011) quantitative study across Africa, Latin America, and Asia 
finds weak correlations between objective measures of delivery (e.g., the 
mere presence of facilities) and citizens’ satisfaction with services. In this 
case, citizens’ assessment of performance appeared to depend instead on 
perceptions of how well government was “trying” to improve them. Re-
cent Afrobarometer public opinion survey data similarly indicate the mere 
presence of physical infrastructure is not significant in shaping popular 
views about government performance. Rather, the quality of the experi-
ence (waiting times, availability of materials such as drugs/textbooks) and 
the accessibility of the service (capacity to pay fees, payment of bribes) 
are key (Asunka 2013). 
Indeed, perceptible improvements in performance may be more signifi-
cant than absolute or verifiable measures of performance for legitimacy. 
In his study in Medellin, Colombia, Guerrero (2011) finds that a quick up 
grade of basic services (infrastructure, health, education) in the city’s less-
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favored districts improved political support for and trust in government.
Rapid improvements generated greater legitimizing returns than slower, 
less perceptible progress. Collectively, these studies indicate that subjec-
tive interpretations of quality and effort (rather than objective measures 
of quality and effort) are significant for the relationship between service 
delivery and state legitimacy.
sense of obligation to 
institutions
Taylor and Jackson (2013) operationalize legitimacy as citizens’ percep-
tions of whether or not they view the legal system and state agents as 
conferring upon them an appropriate and reasonably duty to obey.
Behavior
electoral behavior and 
voter turnout
Gilley (2006a: 509) holds that, beyond for the question of who voters vote 
for, the mere act of voting, “or working from within existing structures”, 
constitutes evidence of consent to the political system.
In a quantitative study of Costa Rican citizens’ attitudes towards their po-
litical regime, support for federal and local government, as well as politi-
cal participation behavior, Booth and Seligson (2005) find that both voting 
and civil society activism are associated with what they operationalize as 
legitimacy.
protest activities and 
contestation 
CAST Fragile States Index Indicator for State Legitimacy includes a mea-
surement of the occurrence of violent riots and peaceful demonstrations 
(FfP 2014: 11).
Wee et al. (2014: 15) argue for the case of Northern Mali, that the “2009 
Family Code protests (…) were fueled by a population conception that the 
expansion of state judicial power would infringe upon the authority” of 
informal justice systems, which they contrast with the lack of legitimacy 
of formal systems.
Booth and Seligson (2005: 546) caution against assuming a linear relation-
ship between political protests and illegitimacy: While disagreement with 
regime principles indeed correlated with protests in their sample of Costa 
Ricas, lower support for regime performance did not.
Gilley (2006a: 508) thus argues that specifically violent protest, which 
shows “the extent to which citizens feel that they must, or are forced to, 
use violence, as opposed to regular and legal forms of social protest”, 
should be a good effect indicator of a state’s justification failures.
law abidance Gilley (2009, 2012) identifies legality and moral justifiability as basic 
sources of support, evidenced in observable actions of consent (quoted 
in Von Haldenwang 2016: 6).
voluntary tax-payment Levi (1988) and Lieberman (2002) view the ability of states to rely on the 
payment of “quasi-voluntary” taxes (taxes that are easier to evade than 
directly levied taxes, like sales and export taxes) as an important measure 
of state legitimacy. States with legitimacy, they argue, will be able to rely 
more on such taxes.
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IV. Top Down Legitimacy Determinants
Performance
rule of law Gilley (2006a: 509) holds that, beyond for the question of who voters vote 
for, the mere act of voting, “or working from within existing structures”, 
constitutes evidence of consent to the political system.
In a quantitative study of Costa Rican citizens’ attitudes towards their po-
litical regime, support for federal and local government, as well as politi-
cal participation behavior, Booth and Seligson (2005) find that both voting 
and civil society activism are associated with what they operationalize as 
legitimacy.
security CAST Fragile States Index Indicator for State Legitimacy includes a mea-
surement of the occurrence of violent riots and peaceful demonstrations 
(FfP 2014: 11).
Wee et al. (2014: 15) argue for the case of Northern Mali, that the “2009 
Family Code protests (…) were fueled by a population conception that the 
expansion of state judicial power would infringe upon the authority” of 
informal justice systems, which they contrast with the lack of legitimacy 
of formal systems.
Booth and Seligson (2005: 546) caution against assuming a linear relation-
ship between political protests and illegitimacy: While disagreement with 
regime principles indeed correlated with protests in their sample of Costa 
Ricas, lower support for regime performance did not.
Gilley (2006a: 508) thus argues that specifically violent protest, which 
shows “the extent to which citizens feel that they must, or are forced to, 
use violence, as opposed to regular and legal forms of social protest”, 
should be a good effect indicator of a state’s justification failures.
In general, most stud-
ies use bottom-up indi-
cators of security (per-
ceptions) rather than 
“objective” numbers 
of security incidents 
to probe a relationship 
between security and 
legitimacy.
Gilley (2009, 2012) identifies legality and moral justifiability as basic 
sources of support, evidenced in observable actions of consent (quoted 
in Von Haldenwang 2016: 6).
minimal level of social 
welfare (e.g. provision 
of health care, drinking 
water, roads, electric-
ity, sanitation)
Levi (1988) and Lieberman (2002) view the ability of states to rely on the 
payment of “quasi-voluntary” taxes (taxes that are easier to evade than 
directly levied taxes, like sales and export taxes) as an important measure 
of state legitimacy. States with legitimacy, they argue, will be able to rely 
more on such taxes.
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Claims 
representation e.g. democratic governments, populist leaders
enforcement of law 
and order
e.g. local strongmen, military leaders or juntas 
religious authority e.g. religious leaders
provision of goods and 
services 
e.g. NGOs, multinational companies
provision of security e.g. warlords, external military actors in conflict areas
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